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Abstract—Refactoring is a common approach to producing bet-
ter quality software. Its impact on many software quality proper-
ties, including reusability, maintainability and performance, has
been studied and measured extensively. However, its impact on
the information security of programs has received relatively little
attention. In this work, we assess the impact of a number of
the most common code-level refactoring rules on data security,
using security metrics that are capable of measuring security
from the point view of potential information flow. The metrics
are calculated for a given Java program using a static analysis
tool we have developed to automatically analyse compiled Java
bytecode. We ran our Java code analyser on various programs
which were refactored according to each rule. New values of the
metrics for the refactored programs then confirmed that the code
changes had a measurable effect on information security.
Keywords-Object-orientation, Software Security, Security Met-
rics, Software Refactoring, Information Flow
I. INTRODUCTION
An important potential aid to achieving secure software
is to refactor security-critical programs to get more secure
code [1] [2] [3]. Refactoring is defined as “a change made
to the internal structure of a program to make it easy to
understand and cheap to modify without changing its observ-
able behaviour” [4]. It has been used widely to improve the
reusability, maintainability and performance of programs. Nev-
ertheless, the quantitative effect of refactoring on information
security is less clear and has received little attention [5].
In previous work we have devised metrics for assessing the
security of object-oriented designs [6] [7] and metrics that
can measure the security of program code [8]. The metrics
measure the potential flow of data from attributes labelled by
the programmer as ‘classified’ through the program code and
are thus helpful for assessing threats to data confidentiality and
integrity. Here, we use these metrics to quantify the impact of
a number of standard refactoring steps on program security.
This is done by first measuring the security of a given program
using our metrics and then measuring the security of other
refactored versions of the same program. To make it easy to
measure the security of the various programs, we used a static
analysis tool which can analyse compiled Java bytecode [8].
This tool allowed us to easily compare the security of different
versions of the same program, and thereby measure the impact
of the refactoring rules on program security.
II. RELATED WORK
There are various existing approaches that aim to improve
programs’ security. One of the earliest studies in this area
was the development of software security design principles by
Saltzer and Schroeder [9]. This was followed by Bishop’s [10]
and Viega and McGraw’s [11] texts which identified several
similar security design principles. How to introduce these
principles into a given program was less clear, however.
On the other hand, code refactoring can enhance a program’s
security. This has been shown in a number of studies including
the work of Maruyama which aims to improve the security of
a given program’s code by identifying its vulnerabilities and
defining a set of secure refactoring rules [1]. Furthermore,
Smith and Thober identified a refactoring approach for critical
systems by refactoring a program’s code into two modules;
a high-security one and a low-security one [3]. Smith and
Thober admit that this is a very challenging task as many
real programs share others’ libraries and code between them.
Therefore, detecting which classes are high security and which
ones are not is, in many cases, very difficult [3].
Another work in the area of secure refactoring is
Hafiz’s [12] which defines a number of secure transformation
rules. These rules aim to refactor program code in order
to change its functionality to prevent well-known kinds of
security vulnerability such as buffer overruns, code injec-
tion attacks, lack of access control and poor isolation. This
approach does not consider the potential flow of classified
information within a given program but instead aims to avoid
well-known coding errors.
However, none of these previous approaches quantify the
impact of changes to the security level of a given program.
Our recent work was on measuring the impact of refactoring
rules on UML designs [5]. In this paper, we extend this work
to the code level to measure the impact of specific refactoring
steps on the data security of a given program’s code.
III. SUMMARY OF SECURITY DATA FLOW METRICS
This section briefly summarises our basic security metrics
for measuring the security of a given object-oriented program
with regard to the way its object-oriented design properties
(data encapsulation, cohesion, composition, coupling, extensi-
bility, inheritance and design size) influence the accessibility
of any classified data it contains. They aim to reveal many
of the vulnerabilities associated with insecure code. Some are
applicable to Unified Modeling Language designs [6] [7] while
others are specific to Java program code. Most of the metrics
produce ratios between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating
less secure code. In other words, the metrics measure the
presence of insecure coding constructs.
TABLE I
SECURITY DATA FLOW METRICS
Property Name Data Flow Metric Description
Absolute
Metrics
CAT Classified Attributes Total The total number of classified attributes in the program.
CMT Classified Methods Total The total number of classified methods in the program.
CCT Critical Classes Total The total number of critical classes in the program.
Data
Encapsulation
CIDA Classified Instance DataAccessibility
The ratio of the number of non-private classified instance attributes to the
number of classified attributes in the program.
CCDA Classified Class DataAccessibility
The ratio of the number of non-private classified class attributes to the number
of classified attributes in the program.
COA Classified OperationAccessibility
The ratio of the number of non-private classified methods to the number of
classified methods in the program.
RPB Reflection PackageBoolean
A boolean value shows whether the Java program imports the reflection
package (1) or not (0).
CMAI Classified MutatorAttribute Interactions
The ratio of the sum of all interactions between mutators and classified
attributes to the possible maximum number of interactions between mutators
and classified attributes in the program.
Cohesion CAAI Classified AccessorAttribute Interactions
The ratio of the sum of all interactions between accessors and classified
attributes to the possible maximum number of interactions between accessors
and classified attributes in the program.
CAIW Classified AttributesInteraction Weight
The ratio of the number of all interactions with classified attributes to the
total number of all interactions with all attributes in the program.
CMW Classified MethodsWeight
The ratio of the number of classified methods to the total number of methods
in the program.
CWMP Classified WritingMethods Proportion
The ratio of the number of methods which write classified attributes to the
total number of classified methods in the program.
Coupling CCC Critical Classes Coupling The ratio of the number of all classes’ links with classified attributes to thetotal number of possible links with classified attributes in the program.
Composition CPCC Composite-Part CriticalClasses
The ratio of the number of critical composed-part classes to the total number
of critical classes in the program.
Extensibility
CCE Critical ClassesExtensibility
The ratio of the number of the non-finalised critical classes in program to
the total number of critical classes in the program.
CME Classified MethodsExtensibility
The ratio of the number of the non-finalised classified methods in a program
to the total number of classified methods in the program.
UACA Unaccessed AssignedClassified Attribute
The ratio of the number of classified attributes that are assigned but never
used to the total number of classified attributes in the program.
UCAM Uncalled ClassifiedAccessor Method
The ratio of the number of classified methods that access a classified attribute
but are never called by other methods to the total number of classified
methods in the program.
UCAC Unused Critical AccessorClass
The ratio of the number of classes which contain classified methods that
access classified attributes but are never used by other classes to the total
number of critical classes in the program.
Inheritance
CSP Critical SuperclassesProportion
The ratio of the number of critical superclasses to the total number of critical
classes in the program’s inheritance hierarchy.
CSI Critical SuperclassesInheritance
The ratio of the sum of classes which may inherit from each critical
superclass to the number of possible inheritances from all critical classes
in the program’s inheritance hierarchy.
CMI Classified MethodsInheritance
The ratio of the number of classified methods which can be inherited in
a hierarchy to the total number of classified methods in the program’s
inheritance hierarchy.
CAI Classified AttributesInheritance
The ratio of the number of classified attributes which can be inherited in
a hierarchy to the total number of classified attributes in the program’s
inheritance hierarchy.
Design Size CDP
Critical Design
Proportion
The ratio of the number of critical classes to the total number of classes in
the program.
CSCP Critical Serialized ClassesProportion
The ratio of the number of critical serialized classes to the total number of
critical classes in the program.
The metrics assess the accessibility of classified data items
with regard to potential data or control flow either via the
program’s Application Programming Interface or through in-
put/output statements. Initially, we rely on the programmer to
label those attributes intended to contain ‘classified’ values.
Then, our tool automatically performs a static data flow
analysis to identify other attributes whose values may also
be influenced by this ‘classified’ data. We consider a method
to be classified if it is has been labelled as ‘classified’ by the
programmer or it interacts with (reads or writes) at least one
classified attribute. In particular a programmer may label a
method classified to indicate that it returns data read from a
high-security external input stream or file. We also consider
a class to be ‘critical’ if it contains attributes labelled as
classified or it has an attribute which may derive its value
from a ‘classified’ attribute. The full collection of metrics is
shown in Table I.
The data encapsulation-based metrics (CIDA, CCDA, COA
and RPB) assess the direct accessibility of classified at-
tributes and methods as well as data accessibility through
reflection [6] [8]. The cohesion-based metrics (CAIW, CAAI,
CAIW, CMW and CWMP) measure the potential flow of
classified attributes’ values to accessor, mutator and writing
methods, penalising programs with a large amount of classified
flow [6] [8]. The coupling-based metric (CCC) measures
interactions between classes and classified attributes, reward-
ing programs that minimise such interactions [7], because it
has been proven that strong coupling makes security attacks
easier [13]. The composition-based metric (CPCC) rewards
programs that use private inner classes for holding classified
data, and penalises the use of outer classes for this purpose [7].
The extensibility-based metrics (CCE, CME, UACA, UCAM
and UCAC) reward programs with fewer opportunities for
extending critical classes or classified methods, and penalise
unused classified attributes, methods or critical classes [7] [8].
These are points at which an attacker can access classified data
without affecting the system’s observable behaviour [14]. The
inheritance-based metrics (CSP, CSI, CMI and CAI) reward
programs with fewer opportunities for inheriting from critical
superclasses, since these allow subclasses to gain privileges
over classified data [7]. The design size-based metrics (CDP
and CSCP) reward programs with a lower proportion of
critical classes [7] [8] and critical serializable classes. Finally,
there are absolute security metrics which count the number
of classified attributes (CAT), classified methods (CMT) and
critical classes (CCT) in a program. Overall, therefore, the
metrics measure the size of the program’s ‘attack surface’,
i.e., those points that allow access to classified data values.
The smaller this surface the better.
IV. SECURITY ASSESSMENT OF REFACTORING RULES
In this paper we consider some standard refactoring rules
which are applicable to an object-oriented program and mea-
sure their potential impact on the data security of a given pro-
gram when applied to security-critical parts of the code. (Our
previous study [5] considered design-level refactoring only.)
Table II lists the refactoring rules and their definitions [4] [15].
All of the chosen rules may have an impact on the size of a
program’s ‘attack surface’ [16] [17] [18]. In the remainder
of this section we assess the likely impact of the refactoring
rules on data security from a programmer’s perspective. These
conclusions can then be contrasted with the measured effect
on security in Section V.
Applying the Add Parameter (AP) rule means that a classi-
fied attribute could potentially be passed as the method’s new
parameter. If the method has another attribute whose value
depends on the new parameter, this will then increase the
number of classified attributes and subsequently the number
of classified methods in the program. Conversely, removing
a method’s parameter could potentially reduce the number of
classified attributes and methods. Therefore, from this point of
view, rule Add Parameter (AP) may decrease the security of
a given program while Remove Parameter (RP) may increase
security.
Refactoring rule Decompose Conditional (DC) aims to
minimise the size of a conditional statement by extracting
each case as a separate method [4]. In terms of security, if
the decomposed case is a classified one (i.e., it reads or writes
classified data), then the extracted method will be classified
as well, and hence the refactoring will increase the number of
classified methods. Therefore, applying this rule may decrease
security, by making more parts of the program security-critical,
and we should try to avoid decomposing security-critical
conditional statements.
The refactoring rule of Replace Delegation with Inheritance
(RDI) aims to reduce the coupling between two classes if a
certain class (delegating) calls all or most of another class’s
methods (delegate). This is done by replacing the delegation
with inheritance by making the delegating class a subclass
of the delegate class [4], which removes coupling between
classes. With regard to this rule’s impact on security-critical
features, it does not change the number of critical classes in
a program. However, it will increase the number of security-
critical superclasses in a program if the delegate class happens
to be a critical one. This has both positive and negative
effects on security. This allows subclasses to acquire more
privileges over classified data which also increases the number
of classified attributes and methods that could be inherited,
making the program less secure. On the other hand, this rule
improves security in another regard as an inheritance relation
between security-critical classes reduces the links between
them, and hence reduces the security coupling-based metric.
An exact contrast to the previous rule is the refactoring rule
of Replacing Inheritance with Delegation (RID) which should
be applied whenever a subclass does not inherit or inherits only
parts of the superclass’s features [4]. In terms of the impact of
this rule on security, again it has positive and negative effects.
In the case where a class affected by this rule happens to
hold some security-critical features then the rule will increase
the number of links to a class with security-critical features,
and it thus increases the coupling-based security metric. On
the other hand, this rule improves security with regard to the
security inheritance-based metrics by decreasing the number
of security-critical superclasses in a program and the number
of classified attributes and methods that could be inherited.
The refactoring rule of Replace Fields with Subclasses
(RFS) helps to improve a program’s structure by introducing
inheritance. It does this by replacing a class’s fields that are
constants with subclasses in a way that does not affect the
behaviour of the class [4]. With regard to the impact of this
rule on a program’s security, it may create a critical subclass
for each classified field, which increases the number of critical
classes in a program, and hence makes it less secure.
The Replacing Subclasses with Fields (RSF) rule aims to
reduce the number of classes in a program by removing those
subclasses with methods which return constant values. This
is done by replacing those methods with fields in the super
class and deleting the subclasses [4]. In terms of this rule’s
effect on security, it may reduce the number of critical classes,
classified fields and classified methods, thus improving the
overall security of a given program.
The refactoring rule of Replace Array with Object (RAO)
TABLE II
CODE-SPECIFIC REFACTORING RULES
Refactoring Rule Identifier Effect
Add Parameter AP Add a parameter to an existing method to pass it extra information.
Remove Parameter RP Remove a parameter from a given method when it is not used.
Decompose Conditional DC Extract a method for each condition and then replace the condition with its correspondingmethod.
Replace Delegation with In-
heritance RDI
Create a subclass for the delegating class if it wants to inherit data from the delegate
class.
Replace Inheritance with Del-
egation RID
If the subclass does not inherit data from a superclass but its data is accessed by the
superclass, then create a delegation between these two classes.
Replace Fields with
Subclasses RFS Replace constant fields with subclasses for each field.
Replace Subclasses with
Fields RSF
Replace subclasses which have methods that return constant data with fields in a
superclass.
Replace Array with Object RAO Replace an array which has elements of different types with an object with fields for eachelement in the array.
Replace Object with Array ROA Replace an object with an array with elements for every field in the object.
Replace Temp with Query RTQ Replace a temporary variable which holds a value of an expression with a method.
Replace Query with Temp RQT Replace a method which holds a value of an expression with a temporary variable.
Remove Setting Method RSM Remove a setting method for a field that only needs to set at the constructor level.
Parameterize Methods PM Replace methods that do similar operations depending on certain values with a methodthat takes a parameter representing these values.
Replace Parameter with Ex-
plicit Methods RPEM
Replace a method which does similar operations depending on the value of its parameter
with methods for each value of its parameter.
Replace Method with Object RMO Replace a long method whose local variables do separate things with a single class whichhas attributes for each of these local variables.
Replace Object with Method ROM Replace attributes of a class which are only called in certain methods with local variablesinside these methods.
aims to create a class for an array whose elements are of
different types and make them fields in the new class [4]. In
terms of the impact of this rule on a program’s security, this
rule will make the program less secure if the replaced array
contains classified data, because this means that the new class
will have a classified field for every element in the array which
means an increase in the number of critical classes, classified
fields and classified methods. The new security-critical class
will also be linked to the original class which will still be
security-critical due to its continued reliance on classified
data. Conversely, using the rule of Replace Object with Array
(ROA) may increase the security of a given program since it
can reduce the number of critical classes, classified fields and
classified methods.
The Replace Temp with Query (RTQ) refactoring rule’s
main objective is to minimise the size of methods by replacing
temporary variables that hold values of expressions with
methods that return these values [4]. This rule in fact simplifies
methods but it also increases their number. With regard to
security, this can have the same effect as the Decompose
Conditional rule as it might increase the number of classified
methods if the values which are held by these local variables
are classified. Thus, this rule may increase the number of
classified methods and, as a result of this, worsen the security
of a program. Conversely, the refactoring rule of Replace
Query with Temp (RQT) aims to reduce the number of
methods in a program by replacing methods’ return values
with temporary variables in a certain method. The effect of
this rule on security is the opposite to the Replace Temp
with Query rule. This means that it may improve the security
of a given program by reducing the number of its classified
methods.
The Remove Setting Method (RSM) refactoring rule aims
to reduce the number of methods in a given class. It allows
us to remove a setting method for a field that only requires to
be set at the creation time of that object [4]. In terms of this
rule’s impact on security, if the removed method is a classified
one then this reduces the number of classified methods in a
class, and hence produces a more secure program.
The Parameterize Method (PM) refactoring rule is applied
when there exist several methods which do similar things
depending on certain values [15]. It allows us to combine
these methods into a single one and then add a parameter
to the new method that represents each of the previous
methods, which eventually reduces the number of methods in
a class [15]. If this rule is applied to methods that interact with
classified attributes, then it will improve security by reducing
the number of classified methods. This will also reduce most
of the other security metrics, especially the cohesion-based and
extensibility-based ones. On the other hand, the Replace Pa-
rameter with Explicit Methods (RPEM) refactoring rule aims
to replace a method that does similar operations depending
on the value of its parameter with a single method for each
possible value of the parameter [15]. With regard to the impact
of this rule on security, it may increase the number of classified
methods if it is applied to a classified method. This increases
the values of other security-based metrics such as cohesion
and extensibility, and thus worsens the overall security of a
program.
Refactoring rule Replace Method with Object (RMO) aims
to decrease the length of a long method with many local
Fig. 1. Example of Security Data Flow Metrics Produced by our Java Bytecode Analyser
variables which hold different values by replacing them with
a single class to implement this method’s operations [15]. The
new class will have a single attribute for each of the local
variables while the old method has to call this class in order
to complete its job [15]. In terms of the impact of this rule on
the overall security of a program, this rule will increase the
number of classified attributes, classified methods and critical
classes if it is applied to a classified method which has local
variables that hold classified values. This will increase the
value of many of the security metrics and, therefore, worsen
the overall security of such a program. On the other hand, the
refactoring rule of Replace Object with Method (ROM) will
decrease the number of classified attributes, classified methods
and critical classes if it is applied to a class whose attributes
are classified, and hence it makes the program more secure.
Thus we can see that each of the selected refactoring
rules can potentially affect a program’s security, if applied
to a security-critical code segment. Next we want to use our
security metrics and analysis tool to confirm this empirically.
V. MEASURING THE IMPACT OF REFACTORING
The following case study illustrates how applying the
refactoring rules shown in Table II impacts the security of
a given program in a way measurable by our security metrics
in Table I, as predicted in Section IV. We expect our total
security index (TSI) for each refactored program to match
our prediction of the impact of these refactoring rules on
data security as predicted in Section IV. To support this,
we used our tool for calculating the metrics from compiled
Java bytecode [8]. An example of its output for one of the
examined programs is shown in Figure 1. To begin, we relied
on the programmer to label those attributes which may contain
classified data as ‘classified’. The tool then identified all
other attributes whose values may be influenced by ‘classified’
attributes automatically.
A. Original Program
The program studied for this work was inspired by refactor-
ing examples presented by Fowler [19]. The program is a small
bank loan system. It consists of four classes: Customer,
Account, Loan and LoanType and is responsible for
managing information about customers’ loans. Figure 2 shows
a class diagram representing the relation between classes for
this example.
The Customer class is responsible for storing information
about a customer. This information consists of the customer’s
name and the accounts used to manage their loans. It in-
cludes a classified attribute authentications for this
class consisting of an array of strings that holds personal
data identifying the customer. This authentication consists of
a telephone number and password. In general, for privacy
reasons, customers do not wish their personal and loans details
 Loan
 
- loanID : String
- loanType : LoanType
  
+ Loan(String _loanID, LoanType _loanType)
+ getLoanType() : LoanType
 
Account
 
- «classified» interestRate : int
- loan : Loan
 
+ Account(Loan _loan, int _interestRate)
+ getInterestRate() : int
+ getLoan() : Loan
 
 LoanType
 
+ final HOME : int
+ final CAR : int
+ final OVERDRAFT : int
- «classified» loanAmount : int
- name : String
 
+ LoanType(String _name, int _loanAmount)
+ getLoanAmount() : int
+ getName : String
 
Customer
 
- name : String
- accounts : Vector<Account>
- «classified» authentications : String[]
 
+ Customer(String _name)
+ getStatement() : String
+ addAccount(Account arg) : void
+ setTelephone(double _phone) : void
+ getTelephone : double
+ setPassword(String _pass) : void
+ getPassword() : String
Fig. 2. Bank Loan Program’s Original Design
Fig. 3. Bank Loan program refactored using Add Parameter
to be made public.
The Account class holds information about the interest
rate of a certain loan, which we also assume is classified. The
Loan class is responsible for storing a loan’s details, including
its ID and its type. The LoanType class holds attributes that
describe the kind of loan, its name and its amount which
represents a distinct value for each loan’s type. For this class,
we assume that the loan amount is classified and thus it needs
to be kept secret.
B. Refactored Programs
This section illustrates the impacts of applying refactoring
rules to the program described in Figure 2 on our security
metrics. Most of these refactoring steps are inspired by similar
ones from Fowler [19] and are defined in Table II. These
refactorings aim to make the program clearer and more
maintainable, and are typical of the kinds of changes that
a developer might reasonably contemplate. (The refactorings
were applied to the Java program source code, but we have
illustrated some using UML class diagrams for clarity.)
Fig. 4. Bank Loan program refactored using Decompose Conditional
 
 LoanType
 
+ final HOME : int
+ final CAR : int
+ final OVERDRAFT : int
- «classified» loanAmount : int
- name : String
 
+ LoanType(LoanType _loanType)
+ getLoanAmount() : int
+ getName : String
 
Loan
 
- loanID : String
  
+ Loan(String _loanID)
Fig. 5. Bank Loan program design refactored using Replace Delegation with
Inheritance
For instance, Figure 3 shows a refactored program using
the Add Parameter rule applied to the original program. This
refactoring step has changed the constructor of the Loan class
from a default one that takes no parameter to a constructor that
takes an integer as a parameter. Then it has created the loan
attribute of type Loan in the Account class with a classified
parameter.
Another refactored program is shown in Figure 4 which
is refactored using the Decompose Conditional rule. This
has been applied on the getStatement method in the
Customer class. It has replaced the conditional cases with
methods representing each case.
 Car
 
 
+ Car(String _name, int _loanAmount)
+ getLoanAmount() : int
 
 Overdraft
 
 
+ Overdraft(String _name, int _loanAmount)
+ getLoanAmount() : int
 
Home
 
 
+ Home(String _name, int _loanAmount)
+ getLoanAmount() : int
 
 LoanType
 
- «classified» loanAmount : int
- name : String
 
+ LoanType(String _name, int _loanAmount)
+ getLoanAmount() : int
+ getName : String
Fig. 6. Bank Loan program refactored design using Replace Fields with Subclasses
 
Customer
 
- name: String
- accounts: Vector<Account>
- authenticate : Authentication
 
+ Customer(String _name)
+ getSatement() : String
+ addAccount(Account arg) : void
+ setAuthenitcate(): void
+ getAuthenticate : Authentication
 
Authentication
 
- «classified» telephone : double
- «classified» password : String
 
+ Authentication (Authentication authenticate)
+ setTelephone(double _phone) : void
+ getTelephone : double
+ setPassword(String _pass) : void
+ getPassword() : String
Fig. 7. Bank Loan program refactored design using Replace Array with
Object
Figure 5 shows the design for a program refactored from
the original one using the Replace Delegation with Inheri-
tance rule. It has removed the attribute loanType of type
LoanType and instead the Loan class has extended the
LoanType class to inherit its features.
The rule Replace Fields with Subclasses has been used to
produce the program design shown in Figure 6. It has been
applied on the LoanType class to replace its constant fields
with subclasses (i.e., Home, Car and Overdraft).
Another refactored design of the original program is shown
in Figure 7. This version is refactored using the Replace
Array with Object rule. The original Customer class has an
array that is used to store the telephone number and the
password of a customer, which are of different types. This
refactored version has a new class to store these two attributes
as shown in the Authentication class in Figure 7.
The refactoring rule of Replace Temp with Query has been
applied to the original program to get a new version as shown
in Figure 8. The affected method is getStatement in
the Customer class. Its temporary variable thisAmount
has been replaced with a method called getCharge in the
Account class.
Figure 9 shows a revised version of the Customer class
Fig. 8. Bank Loan program refactored using Replace Temp with Query
 
Customer
 
- name : String
- accounts : Vector<Account>
- «classified» authentications : String[]
 
+ Customer(String _name, String[] _authentications)
+ getStatement() : String
+ addAccount(Account arg) : void
+ getTelephone : double
+ getPassword() : String
Fig. 9. Bank Loan program design refactored using Remove Setting Method
Fig. 10. Bank Loan program refactored using Parameterize Method
 
Customer
 
- name : String
- accounts : Vector<Account>
- «classified» authentications : String[]
 
+ Customer(String _name)
+ getStatement() : String
+ addAccount(Account arg) : void
+ setTelephone(double _phone) : void
+ getTelephone : double
+ setPassword(String _pass) : void
+ getPassword() : String
 
Statement
 
- totalAmount : double
- frequentCustomerPoints : int
 
+ getStatement(Vector<Account> _accounts) : String
Fig. 11. Bank Loan program design refactored using Replace Method with
Object
after applying the Remove Setting Method refactoring rule.
This has resulted in removing all setter methods of the
authentications array, and replacing them with a param-
eter in the Customer’s class constructor whose responsibility
is to set the authentications attribute.
Figure 10 shows the result of applying the Pa-
rameterize Method rule on the setters and getters of
authentications attribute in the Customer class. The
rule has resulted in replacing the four methods that set and
get the authentications attribute with two methods.
The result of applying the refactoring rule of Replace
Method with Object on the getStatement method in the
Customer class is shown in Figure 11. The result is a new
class called Statement which has the same responsibilities
of the original getStatement method in the Customer
class. However, the original getStatement method now
has to call the new method in order to implement its job.
C. Security Metrics Results
Table III shows the results of evaluating our security met-
rics, defined in Table I, for the original and refactored pro-
grams described in Section V-B. The arrows indicate whether a
metric has increased, stayed the same or decreased. Given that
lower values of each metric are considered more secure, then
we consider those refactoring rules which reduce these values,
compared with those of the original program, to be refactoring
rules that may make programs more secure (indicated by
green, downward arrows). On the other hand, refactoring rules
which increase the value of the metrics are considered to
be rules that may make programs less secure (red, upward
arrows).
For instance, applying the refactoring rule Replace Method
with Object (RMO) has resulted in an increase for most
of the security metrics. This includes all of the Absolute
metrics, CAIW and CMW of the Cohesion-based metrics,
UCAM and UCAC of the Extensibility-based metrics, and
CDP of the Design size-based metrics. On the other hand,
the values of CMAI and CAAI of the Cohesion-based metrics
and Coupling-based metric CCC have decreased. In total,
therefore, we say that applying the RMO rule has a negative
impact on security because it increases the metrics overall.
(Elsewhere we show how weights may be applied to the
metrics [8] but for the moment we are treating them as all
equal.)
However, if we apply the refactoring rule Replace Object
with Method (ROM) to the program in Figure 11 to the
original program as in Figure 2, then we expect to see the
opposite impact on the security metrics to the impact of
Replace Method with Object (RMO). This means that ROM
may decrease most of the metrics, and hence it may improve
overall security of a program.
The final row of the table indicates how the refactoring rules
affect the security of a program based on their total security
index values (TSI) [8]. This is a weighted sum of the individual
metrics which gives higher weights to metrics that directly
TABLE III
SECURITY METRICS RESULTS
Metric Original AP DC RDI RFS RAO RTQ RSM PM RMO  
CAT 3 4 3 3 3 5 3 3 3 5
CMT 10 11 13 11 13 12 11 8 8 12
CCT 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 4
CIDA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CCDA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
COA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
RPB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CMAI 0.25 0.2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.175 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.233
CAAI 0.182 0.167 0.182 0.212 0.182 0.133 0.195 0.148 0.148 0.133
CAIW 0.429 0.5 0.429 0.474 0.429 0.5 0.435 0.368 0.368 0.52
CMW 0.667 0.688 0.722 0.786 0.619 0.667 0.688 0.615 0.615 0.706
CWMP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CPCC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
CCC 0.222 0.25 0.222 0.222 0.167 0.2 0.222 0.222 0.222 0.2
CCE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
CME 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
UACA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
UCAM 0.667 0.75 0.667 0.714 0.667 0.5 0.714 0.5 0.5 0.75
UCAC 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.25 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.5
CSP 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
CSI 0 0 0 0.333 0.5 0 0 0 0 0
CMI 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
CAI 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
CDP 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.429 0.8 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.8
CSCP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
52.42 63.19TSI 56.36 59.06 59.69 70.87 70.45 59.37 57.91 52.42
measure the proportion of classified attributes. From Table III,
we can see that the Add Parameter rule has increased most of
the security metrics when compared with the original program,
and hence applying the rule made the program less secure. On
the other hand, the Remove Setting Method (RSM) rule’s total
security impact shows a decrease in most of these metrics, and
hence this rule made the program more secure.
Of course the most secure program is one which has a lower
value with regard to all of these security metrics. Inevitably,
however, the results show that we usually face a trade off be-
cause reducing one metric often results in increasing another,
which is why it is often best to show the programmer the
whole set of individual metrics, not just the Total Security
Index (TSI).
D. Code Refactoring Rules Assessment
The last row of Table III shows the total impact of each
refactoring rule on the overall security of the given program
with regard to each security metric. An upward red “↑” means
that the refactoring rule increased the total security index
metric’s value for the examined program, and hence worsened
its overall security. A downward green “↓” means that the
refactoring rule decreased the values of the total security
index metric, and hence improved security in this regard. An
amber “→” indicates no effect of the refactoring rule on the
program’s security.
The case study has confirmed our code-level assessment
about how these refactoring rules should affect security as
discussed in Section V-B. For instance, the Add Parameter rule
has worsened security since most of the metrics have increased
when this rule is applied. This has been confirmed by its TSI
when compared to the TSI of the original program. This also
means that the Remove Parameter rule would improve security
if it is applied to Figure 3 to get the original program which
is shown in Figure 2.
This situation is also applicable to other rules, including
Decompose Conditional, Replace Delegation with Inheritance,
Replace Fields with Subclasses, Replace Array with Object,
Replace Temp with Query, Replace Parameter with Explicit
Methods and Replace Method with Object. These rules have
proved that they can increase many of the security metrics,
so these rules, in addition to Add Parameter, will worsen the
overall security of a given program if they are applied on
security-critical code. Furthermore, the TSI of the programs
which these refactoring rules are applied to confirm this
prediction.
By contrast, the Remove Parameter, Replace Inheritance
with Delegation, Replace Subclasses with Fields, Replace
Object with Array, Remove Setting Method, Replace Query
with Temp, Parameterize Methods and Replace Object with
Method refactoring rules can improve security as shown by the
way they decrease many of the security metrics, as predicted
in Section V-B. (These complementary rules are not shown
in Table III.) This is demonstrated in the case study for the
Remove Setting Method and Parameterize Methods. However,
other rules which have not been shown in this case study
(i.e., Remove Parameter, Replace Inheritance with Delegation,
Replace Subclasses with Fields, Replace Object with Array,
Replace Query with Temp and Replace Object with Method)
would have an opposite effect and worsen security.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work we have studied the impact of sixteen refactor-
ing rules on overall program security and illustrated this using
a specific case study. This assessment has been carried out
using our security metrics for measuring security with regard
to potential information flow. Then the total security index
(TSI) of each of the refactored programs in this study has
confirmed our prediction of the effect of the rules on security
for a given program. Out of the studied refactoring rules, it
has been shown that eight could improve the overall security
of a given program while the remaining eight may worsen
its security. These results can serve to guide the application
of refactoring rules to security-critical programs, alerting the
programmer to potentially unsafe refactoring steps. Of course,
a single case study is insufficient to produce entirely general
conclusions about these rules, but given that the metrics
confirm our assessment about the effect of the refactoring rules
on security, we can have some confidence in the results.
This study allows us to identify those refactoring rules
which improve our security metrics because they implement
general strategies for mitigating API-level security vulnera-
bilities. For example, the Parameterise Methods refactoring
rule helps mitigate the security vulnerability of accidentally
leaking sensitive information by replacing methods that do
similar operations depending on certain classified values with
a single method that instead takes a parameter representing
these values. This measurably improves the CAAI, CAIW and
CMW security metrics. A similar example is to use the Re-
move Setting Method refactoring rule which removes a setting
method for a field that only needs to be set at the constructor
level. This rule can mitigate the security vulnerability of failing
to protect stored data from being maliciously modified and
hence makes the system more secure with regard to the CAAI,
CAIW and CMW security metrics.
On the other hand, the study has shown that there are
refactoring rules that need to be avoided in order to eliminate
the possibility of introducing API-level security vulnerabilities.
These include the Replace Fields with Subclasses rule which
replaces constant fields with subclasses for each field. This rule
can place security-critical data towards the top of the class
hierarchy which allows unauthorised objects to maliciously
inherit classified information through critical superclasses.
This makes the program more vulnerable, and hence using
such a refactoring rule could worsen security with regard to
the CSP, CSI, CMI and CAI metrics.
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